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Introduction
It is no coincidence that each of the so-called masters of suspicion –
those whose thought is commonly taken to shape contemporary
thought: Marx, Nietzsche and Freud – looked to ancient Greece as a
golden age of artistic inspiration.1 For each, early Greek civilisation
represents a wellspring of aesthetic vitality, a full appreciation of
which is lost to later Western thought. And even so apparently
atheistic a thinker as Nietzsche is content to allow to Homer and to
Hesiod that their inspiration is properly conceived as divine: ‘What is
essential in art remains its perfection of existence, its production of
perfection and plenitude: art is essentially affirmation, blessing,
deification of existence’.2 For Nietzsche, the decline in the Western
understanding of art began with Plato’s devaluation of the artist to
mere copyist of nature. And the Christian appropriation of the
Platonic approach – to art as to life – is a clear manifestation of man’s
loss of a sense of his own dignity and worth, values that Nietzsche
believes are most clearly expressed in early Greek art. It is this
                                                           
1 In Section Four of the Introduction of the Grundisse, Marx speaks of Greek art
nostalgically as expressing the ‘truth’ of the ‘childhood’ of our civilization, ‘its most
beautiful unfolding’: Karl Marx, Grundisse, trans Martin Nicolaus (London, 1973).
Freud’s love of antiquity is well-known, attested by the extraordinary art collection
he took out of Vienna in 1938. A recent study has linked his love of these sculptures
to the development of his theory – particularly the theory of the Oedipus Complex:
Janine Burke, The Sphinx on the Table: Sigmund Freud’s Art Collection and the
Development of Psychoanalysis (New York, 2006). Nietzsche’s veneration of Greek
art is expressed at great length throughout his works, from the earliest: see The Birth
of Tragedy, trans Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1967).
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans Walter Kaufmann and R J
Hollingdale (New York, 1967) Book IV, Section 821. See Homer, The Odyssey, trans
Robert Fitzgerald (Garden City, 1961) 127, and Hesiod, Theogony, Works and Days,
trans M L West (Oxford, 1988) 3-4, 22ff on the divine inspiration of art.
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‘Platonic inversion’ that propels man in the slide into scepticism and
nihilism that Nietzsche so forcefully diagnoses.3
The question of this paper is posed against the background of this
admixture of loss and alienation sometimes dubbed the ‘postmodern
condition’. The question concerns the role and status of the
transcendent in art and is approached by way of the philosophy and
theology inspired by the ‘masters of suspicion’. Do notions of
transcendence still have a role to play in our understanding of art?
How is such transcendence to be conceived in this sphere, if notions
of divine inspiration no longer hold sway? And what is the relation of
transcendence to immanence, to which it has for centuries been
opposed? In this paper I propose that (our postmodern condition
notwithstanding) notions of transcendence still have a role to play in
art and that this role is so fundamental as to suggest a continuity with
ancient views of art as divinely inspired.
The Limits of an Immanent Aesthetic
Nietzsche is notorious in religion and theology for his diagnosis of
the death of God in modernity. Yet Nietzsche’s condemnation of the
Platonic approach to art has in large measure to do with this issue of
the divine inspiration that he took to be necessary to the flourishing of
the artistic. (This discussion is thus of a piece with a larger retrieval
of Nietzsche’s views for thought on religion that has been taking
place over the last decade or so.)4 Plato’s views on art waver
somewhat across his corpus, but the prevailing view denies the artist
any claim to have somehow touched the transcendent. Initiating a
grand tradition of thought on art that has only lost its hold in the last
century, Plato famously argued that art is a simulacrum, a second-
order reflection of a perfect order which is manifest only in the
thought of the Forms – which is to say, the thought of God. Indeed,
art rests at a second remove from reality, in that it is a copy of a copy
                                                           
3 Nietzsche’s belief that art is the highest expression of the will to power, as the
means by which man ‘stamps becoming with the character of being’, is presented in
The Will to Power, ibid, Book III, Sections 616-617.
4 See for example Merold Westphal, ‘Nietzsche as a Theological Resource’, Modern
Theology 13:2, 1997, 213-226.
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of the Forms, the first-order copy being the world of appearance.5
Thus the interpretations that Homer inspires provide no knowledge;
strictly speaking, they are irrational, since the purveyor of the arts
cannot know whether or not what he or she is saying is true – nor
even exactly what it is that he or she is saying when speaking on this
subject.6
The identification of the thought of the Forms with the mind of God
shows how easily Platonic ideas could be incorporated into early
Christian thought. So too, Plato’s notion of the simulacrum may be
adopted to express the idea that God’s handiwork in the days of
creation is reproduced (albeit on an infinitely reduced scale) in the
labours of the artist. In the Christian context, the idea of a relation
between the divine and human artist has generally served to dignify
the artistic, in particular for its ability to reflect and embody the
beautiful. For Augustine, the grounds for this positive assessment
have to do with the normative judgement that is essential to art, to the
assessment of beauty of form. The artist has the ability to improve on
nature, observing the internal harmony and symmetry of parts to the
whole. In order to appreciate such harmony, artist and spectator alike
employ an understanding of an ideal order that can only be given by
‘divine illumination’.7 The medieval Neoplatonists inherited from
their Academic forbears a fondness for metaphors of the ‘divine light’
under which the thing of beauty is perceived, and saw it as expressing
                                                           
5 Plato, Republic in The Dialogues of Plato, 3rd Edition, trans B Jowett (Oxford,
1892) Vol 3, 598-601. Distinguishing between four levels of cognition in the
Republic, Plato places imagining – and by implication the imaginative techne – at the
lowest (ibid, 509-511). But elsewhere, he is more circumspect about allowing any
authentic content to the arts. In the Gorgias, for example, he speaks of painting as a
pseudo-craft, a ‘knack’ of the decorative, without genuine value (Plato, Gorgias,
463-65, Dialogues, Vol 2). Interestingly, the low cognitive content of the arts allies it
to certain religious phenomena: like the diviner, who may receive genuine
knowledge as a result of possession by a divinity, the artist may be possessed of a
madness (mania) courtesy of the Muses (Plato, Meno 99c, Dialogues, Vol 2). Be that
as it may, the criterion for judgment of the value of the art produced is truth,
understood as resemblance to reality.
6 Plato, Phaedrus 532c, Dialogues, Vol 3.
7 Augustine, De Musica, trans WF Jackson Knight (Westport, 1986) IV, xii, 34.
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an affinity of human soul to divine source.8 The Platonic emphasis on
the contemplation of form implicit in such a philosophy of art made it
highly sympathetic to the artistic revival of the Renaissance, as to
later Romanticism.
Pulling in the opposite direction, however, one might also cite an
abiding distrust of artistic pretension in the history of the Church, and
repeated restatements of the iconoclastic sentiments of the early
generations: there must be no possibility of confusion between the
activities of divine and human artistry. The work of nature is of a
different aesthetic order from that of the artist, if indeed the notion of
the aesthetic can legitimately be applied to divine creation: might
God not suffer limitation if governed by a requirement to adhere to
aesthetic principles? And how might the principles governing divine
creation be known, in any case? To dispel the possibility of
confusion, Christian thought regularly revisits this Platonic
distinction between the two conceptual spheres: the transcendent –
the realm of the eternal and the absolute, of God – and the immanent
– the realm of the transient, of Man.9 On the iconoclastic approach,
artistic creation cannot be thought to straddle this divide.
It is undoubtedly in an iconoclastic frame of mind that Nietzsche’s
proclamation of the death of God was made. It bespoke late
modernity’s alienation from traditional notions and models of
transcendence. The iconoclastic sentiment forcefully expressed by
Nietzsche is widely considered at the root of the ‘turn to immanence’
in the grip of which contemporary thought remains. Received wisdom
                                                           
8 The source of these metaphors may be traced to the Neoplatonic School of Plotinus,
who in several essays of the Enneads, speaks of the experience of beauty as the
participation of the soul in divinity. The beautiful thing is unified by its ideal form,
which is an expression of the One Principle underlying all, and an emanation of the
Divine Mind. Plotinus, Enneads, trans Stephen Mackenna (London and New York,
1991) I, i, 8 and I, iii, 2.
9  The dichotomy of transcendence/immanence feeds iconoclasm by supporting the
claim that the sacred (a reflection of the transcendent) should be protected from the
incursions of the artistic (a reflection of the immanent). But it may also provide a
means by which the icon may be preserved: by asserting the impermeability of
division between icon (transcendent) and idol (immanent). See for example, Jean Luc
Marion, The Idol and Distance: Five Studies (New York, 2001).
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has it that the art world was one of the earliest and most enthusiastic
advocates of this turn. Twentieth century art is nothing if not
iconoclastic; therein lies the artists’ newfound reputation for
radicalism. The major aesthetic movements of the last century
–abstract, expressionist and symbolist, among others – take art to be
governed, not by faithfulness of representation of an external reality,
but of expression of an inner reality. On the face of it, then, this art
represents an about-face from Platonic views of art, from the view of
art as simulacrum of a higher reality and from the view of the artist as
purveyor of beauty. It represents a rehabilitation of the imagination,
with a decidedly un-Platonic concern for the conditions of creativity,
originality and inventiveness of expression.
That said, the contemporary demand for a purely immanent aesthetic
remains constantly challenged by the perennial artistic quest for depth
of content – a quest that at times takes on distinctly religious or
mystical overtones. The religious nature of the quest starts to reveal
itself where the artist seeks structures and forms for the expression of
the inner reality at issue: to show that this reality has a significance
that transcends the merely particular. It becomes more apparent
where the artistic sensibility reiterates some of the qualities of the
sensibility of the divine: where the inner reality is perceived as
fleeting, indeterminate and barely articulate, for example. The artist,
like the mystic, is commonly seen to struggle with themes that are
refractory to expression or illustration. It is also apparent where these
themes have to do with the reconciliation or harmonisation of such
dualities as intuition and experience, cognition and emotion,
consciousness and unconsciousness – and ultimately, with the
reconciliation of man and his world. And finally, the religious nature
of the artistic quest is especially evident where these themes are
figured by appeal to symbolic forms that are themselves steeped in a
hermeneutic tradition: in the symbology of light and dark, purity and
impurity, ethereality and sensuality, and the like. The hermeneutic
governing the interpretation of these symbols in the West cannot
escape its religious inheritance. The artist has not the power
unilaterally to disavow this history.
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So it is that the modern artist continues to struggle with questions of
sublimity, ultimacy, ideality and the like – in short, with questions
traditionally delineated as religious. And one finds the theorist of art
appealing to concepts that have been all but abandoned elsewhere in
the humanities: of harmony and coherence; unity and wholeness;
purity and truth, for example. Consider, by way of an example, how
art critic Allan Kaprow discusses the ‘purist’ aesthetic of Piet
Mondrian and its ‘aura of theology’:
One can indeed venture to guess that it was Mondrian who identified purity
for us in modern painting and, further, that he alone was able to carry its
method of execution so far beyond itself that the method became a
purification rite … The answer for him lay at the ‘heart of the matter’, in
the continuous and polarized forces of the universe, not in the seeable
world. But the seeable painting was to reveal it, however momentarily, for
nothing else would. So he set himself the task of creating a visible
vocabulary for what until then had been invisible.
The task was a test of his imagination as much as his insight – his ultimate
creative act, without which he would never have made his point. This
utterly simple hypothesis – that in the perpendicular relations of two
straight lines, varying in length and width and axially aligned with the
ocean’s horizon and with the force of gravity, the Truth is revealed – gave
his work of coherency that the work of his contemporaries did not have.
The equation is, above all, easy to see, and it is easy to feel from this
cruciform relationship a vague Christian meaningfulness …10
For many contemporary philosophers and theologians – as for the
artist and art critic themselves – the artistic is a realm where concepts
of the exaltation and ennoblement of the ‘spirit’ of man remain
viable, where notions of rebirth and redemption, beatitude and
sacrifice still have meaning.11 For some, it is the only such realm. The
artist is then charged – as by Nietzsche and again by Heidegger –
with the burden of answering those questions of ultimate concern that
                                                           
10  Allan Kaprow, ‘Impurity’ in Jeff Kelley (ed) Essays on the Blurring of Art and
Life, (Berkeley, 1993) 29-31.
11 Such a view of art dates to a series of publications of the 1930s and1940s, among
which John Dewey’s highly influential Art as Experience is perhaps the most
important. In this work, he proclaims the ‘comsummatory’ role of art as a celebration
of the highest of cultural values. John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York, 1935).
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have left the modern philosopher foundering.12 For Nietzsche, art
performs the function of reconciling man to his existence, since ‘only
as an aesthetic phenomenon can the world be justified to all eternity’.
Art is portrayed as a redeeming and healing enchantress; she alone
may transform the terror and absurdity of existence ‘into
imaginations with which it is possible to live’.13
Leftist Thought and the Concept of Transcendence
As an example of these tendencies in modern art, let me consider a
debate that proved highly influential upon leftist thought of the
twentieth century: the struggle between realist and formalist
principles in art in early Soviet Russia. Interestingly, one finds
religious or quasi-religious motifs employed on both sides of this
debate. On the one side, the realists claimed that Man – the New
Man, the Man in the process of creating himself – deserves an art that
represents the highest in him and that reflects the enormity of his
aspirations. This is an art that allows Man to see himself as heroic, as
God-like. The egalitarian principle underlying this approach is so
thoroughgoing as to flatten the differences, not merely between Man
and Man, but between Man and God also (though notably not
between Man and woman; the gendering of this paragraph is
intentional). The quasi-religious aspect of this ruggedly materialist
aesthetic is manifest in its desire to sacralise this world above all else.
It is perhaps evident also in its propensity to dogmatism, in its
willingness to impose a vision of transcendence upon a populace,
rather than to let it grow organically.
On the other side, the futurists reclaimed the Russian spirit of
iconoclasm as the basis of an aesthetic principle. (The irony of this
stance deserves comment.) Their destruction of received imagery was
the artistic equivalent of the negative theologian’s ‘no, not that, not
                                                           
12 So, for example, in a remarkable essay ‘The Origin of a Work of Art’, Heidegger
presents art as a pivotal medium of truth by which we may understand ourselves. Art,
he says, ‘lets truth originate’; ‘it is the becoming and happening of truth’: in Poetry,
Language, Thought, trans Albert Hofstadter (New York, 1971) 71, 77.
13 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, op cit, Section 5 and Section 7.
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that, not that’ to the perennial desire for representation of God.14 The
avant-garde artists’ experimentation with colour, form and texture
may be interpreted as one of the finest expressions of the freedom of
these purely this-worldly artistic elements. It is a refusal to allow the
artistic to be co-opted to an ulterior religious or political motive – a
refusal, that is, of art’s status as icon. The authenticity of the artistic
medium lies on its surface and so is apparent for all to see. In this
respect as in others, the avant-garde art of the early twentieth century
upheld the most precise egalitarian principles that fuelled the
revolutionary Left from the beginning. In this they shared with their
realist comrades ‘an almost Messianic belief in the power of art to
transform the world’.15
But, here as elsewhere in modernity’s journey into immanence, one is
entitled to discern a finer statement of a principle of the transcendent.
Just as the negative theologian may be charged (by Jacques Derrida,
for example16) with denying all merely human speech of God so as to
preserve from desecration a higher sphere that is more properly
Godlike, so too the abstract artist may be considered to promote his
or her own principle of the absolute, of purity of form. The abstract
artist, like the Desert Father, is drawn to a desert landscape (the blank
canvass) so as to give the infinite the chance to speak in its own
terms. So Kazimir Malevich speaks of his break with the image as ‘a
blissful sensation of being drawn to a “desert” where nothing is real
but feeling, and feeling became the substance of my life’.17 In this
desert landscape, the aesthetic sensibility must find its own sources of
fertility and growth; received models no longer obtain, no longer
constrain. The notion of the aesthetic returns once more to its place of
                                                           
14 See Bruce Chatwin, ‘George Costakis: the Story of an Art Collector in the Soviet
Union’ in What am I Doing Here? (London, 1990) 163.
15 Ibid, 154.  This may have allowed the abstract artist a refuge for longer than might
have been expected in the political turbulence of the early Soviet state; abstract art
was nevertheless banned by the 1930s. By the First All-Union Congress of Soviet
Writers in 1934, the State had instituted Socialist Realism by fiat.
16 Derrida argues that negative theology thus incorporates a ‘hyperessentialism’ that
it infinitely positive, not negative, as ‘negative theology’ implies. Jacques Derrida,
‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (eds)
Derrida and Negative Theology (New York, 1992).
17 Quoted in Chatwin, op cit, 163.
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origin in Platonic conceptuality, staking a claim in respect of purity of
form itself.
Extrapolating beyond the artistic, leftist thought in general remains
thoroughly preoccupied with such questions of the relation of the
immanental to the transcendent, materiality to ideality, immediacy to
ultimacy, man to spirit (however conceived). Such concerns continue
to fuel a utopian element in leftist thought that has survived the
postmodern ‘scourge’. Recent liberatory movements – feminism and
postcolonial movements, for example – have been charged with a
dual task not dissimilar to that which challenged the early Soviet
revolutionaries – and have adopted related concepts of transcendence
to address it. They are required to give their constituency a voice, to
speak of their experience of what is, but at the same time to deny that
voice for the sake of something incommensurably higher. If they
deny the present, it is for the sake of the possibility of a future which
is radically other than that which presents itself. The tension between
the immanent and the transcendental is given a powerful
contemporary statement in this dual political motif: on the one hand,
the need of the critic to immerse him – or herself in the violence of
the present so as to serve as advocate for those who are its victim; on
the other, the need to dissociate oneself from the politics of negation
and confrontation, to carve out a conceptual space in which to think
of a future utterly undetermined by such violence. The postmodern in
general is challenged by this dialectic of immanence and
transcendence. The fate of received concepts of transcendence are
here of central concern: if modernity’s turn to immanence resolves
into nihilism, by what values is humanity to be ‘saved’?18
How, then, to think of the transcendent, of what absolutely exceeds
the here and now, from the vantage of the present? How to envisage a
beyond, while taking seriously the contours of the here and now from
which it must (somehow) emerge? How, in particular, can a utopian
vision erupt from the depths of the scepticism and alienation that is
                                                           
18 I refer to Heidegger’s famous exclamation that ‘only a God can save us’. Martin
Heidegger, ‘Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel’s Interview with Martin
Heidegger’, Philosophy Today 20:4, 1976.
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the legacy of modernity? If leftist politics is to be something more
than merely a wrecking party (which arguably, futurism and
postmodernism have at times become) this question of what exceeds
the limits of the present is a pressing one and must be concretely
addressed. But how to address that which, ex hypothesi, lies beyond
the horizon of the seen? For Derrida, as for Emmanuel Levinas, this
futural aspect of the transcendent makes it transcendental in the full
Kantian sense: it is a condition of possibility of the lived present
which is nevertheless incapable in principle of self-disclosure in the
present.19 The transcendent manifests only as a trace in the present.
How, then, to take hold of the present as a blank canvass on which an
outline of an ideal future is to be traced?
Differing Concepts of Transcendence
I will grant that my discussion is wavering ambiguously between (at
least) two concepts of the transcendent. These might be termed
metaphysical and temporal transcendence – or, with Luce Irigaray,
vertical and horizontal transcendence. Irigaray distinguishes between
(on the one hand) the projection on the part of man of ideals of self
theorised to be universal, absolute, necessary, eternal and therefore
divine in the received (Platonic) sense, and (on the other) the creation
of a ‘horizon of the infinite’ which will nurture and sustain a sense of
the possibilities of one’s becoming. This is ‘a path into infinity that is
always open, in-finite’ and is divine in the sense that it points to
values that are ultimate, ideal and transcending.20 These differing
concepts of transcendence have not been clearly distinguished here,
and it is not, I suppose, sufficient to note in my defence that the
Christian tradition has long been content to obscure their differences.
                                                           
19 The preoccupation with this theme in the work of both these philosophers –
especially in Derrida’s later writings – are what have attracted many theologians and
philosophers of religion to them. See for example John D Caputo, The Prayers and
Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington, 1997) Chapter 2.
20 Luce Irigaray, ‘Love of Same, Love of Other’ in An Ethics of Sexual Difference,
trans Carolyn Burke and Gillian C Gill (Ithaca, 1993) 104. In theorizing the latter of
these, Irigaray proposes what she calls a ‘sensible transcendental’, a concept of the
spiritualization of the flesh in which the divine is manifest.
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These differing models of transcendence may be identified in many
different fields or disciplines: in philosophy, theology, aesthetics,
ethics and politics, among others. The difference between these two
models, for example, has been explored in the last century in debates
over the possibility of presenting a visionary aesthetic. It is expressed
in the difference between two forms of purity that may be discerned
in twentieth century art: on the one hand, the search for a vision of
the higher sphere, of the laws governing nature or the spirit
underlying matter; and on the other, the search for an ideality of form,
for the ultimate geographical simplification, which takes flight
beyond materiality into a mystical beyond. The former search is
associated with Mondrian and the latter with Malevich. Each
expresses an appeal to the transcendent, the former in its gesture
towards something deeper or higher, and the latter in its gesture
towards something new or novel. It is the latter which expresses the
futural dimension which, I have suggested, lends it to the service of a
visionary aesthetic.
There are nevertheless evident similarities between metaphysical and
temporal notions of transcendence, which justify the common term –
and go some way in justifying the Christian tendency to conflate
them. Three of these similarities, in particular, point to the critical
role that concepts of transcendence continue to play in contemporary
thought. The first I have mentioned: the transcendent has consistently
been spoken of – and addressed – as what lies beyond the limits of
the sayable, of the presentable and the comprehensible. This property
has earned it the title of the ‘other’ in philosophy and theology: the
transcendent escapes our attempts to define and determine it. It is not
subject to, nor an object of, the imagery or other representational
forms we invoke in reference to it. It has a certain conceptual
autonomy in relation to our conceptual and representational
categories. This represents a continuing Platonic theme in
contemporary philosophies and theologies (even those at the furthest
remove from the received Platonic agenda): the other transcends.
The second common feature arises as a result of this distance of the
transcendent, and concerns the stance that the transcendent demands.
The transcendent is the object, not of knowledge, but of faith. One
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does not – indeed, one cannot in principle – place faith in that which
is fully self-disclosed, which is an empirical object like others.
Whether this faith is expressed in prayerful silence or in Dionysian
joy, the stance of faith towards the transcendent is one of a profound
‘yea-saying’, a ‘come!’ or ‘amen!’. Levinas speaks of it as the
expression of an ethical demand and is experienced as the obligation
that one feels in the face of the other, the stranger, who appeals to one
with a silent plea and ethical demand for justice. This stranger
appears phenomenally as exteriority, which ‘introduces into me what
was not in me’.21 By way of my obligation to, and responsibility for,
the other, ‘I bear witness to the infinite’.22
The third common feature supplements the ontological and ethical
dimensions of this philosophy of the other with an epistemic
dimension: this stance of faith towards the transcendent is necessarily
unfounded.23 It has no basis or foundation in the justifications that
may be offered for it on the basis of present evidence. Faith does not
seek evidential support; it is a sensibility that thrives only in the
absence of criteria. Basil Mitchell describes this faith by way of an
analogy with the faith of the freedom fighter in his or her accomplice,
also figured as a stranger. While unfounded, it is nevertheless a faith
on which one will stake one’s life.  And it is in a particular sense
necessary since, in the final account, one’s aims cannot be achieved
without it. It is a condition of possibility of thought and action in the
present.24
                                                           
21 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans Alphonso
Lingis (Pittsburgh, 1979) 43.
22 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, trans Alphonso
Lingis (The Hague and London, 1981) 149.
23 Paul Moyaert has written most convincingly on the unfounded nature of the act of
faith in the transcendent, both secular and religious, and my discussion here is
indebted to his. Paul Moyaert, ‘On Faith and the Experience of Transcendence: An
Existential Reflection on Negative Theology’, in Flight of the Gods: Philosophical
Perspectives on Negative Theology (New York, 2000) Chapter 13.
24 See Antony Flew, R M Hare and Basil Mitchell, ‘Theology and Falsification’ in E
D Klemke (ed) To Believe or Not to Believe: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion,
(Fort Worth, 1992) Chapter 6.
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The notion of faith that I am defending here is, in short, non-
representational, pre-reflexive and other-directed. This concept of
faith implies an object. Characterising this object in human terms,
both Levinas and Mitchell (in a rare moment of agreement between
continental and analytic philosophical traditions) identify him or her
as a stranger. Their point is to suggest that the object of faith is
ultimately unknown; it is not something familiar to us as other objects
may be. This object is transcendent, not only in the sense that it is
other, but also in the sense that it is the proper condition for the
existence of the faith that it inspires in me. While the other remains
always and necessarily other to me, the faith that I have in the other is
nevertheless something that is properly my own and defines me for
myself in relation to others. In this sense the other constitutes me as
who I am in relation to it. My faith in the other – and, as its
‘transcendental condition’, the other itself – is fundamental to me in
this way.
It is commonly held that, in taking Cartesian doubt to its logical
conclusion, the so-called masters of suspicion have undermined our
entitlement to faith, to appeal to the transcendent. Their legacy,
viewed positively, lies in the exhaustive reappraisal of concepts of
immanence that their thought has inspired. Viewed negatively, their
legacy is a wave of doubt and nausea such as accompanies any
journey on high seas (to borrow Nietzsche’s metaphor). An
alternative perspective has, however, recently begun to take shape,
which pays greater heed to the utopian, prophetic and epiphanic
modes of their thought – which focuses, that is to say, not only
Nietzsche’s ‘new seas’ but also on the islands where one anchors
along the way. This perspective demands, not the abandonment of
transcendence for immanence, but a different conception of the nature
of each and status of each in relation to the other. The concept of the
transcendent as the proper object of faith goes some way to meet this
demand.
Conceiving the transcendent in these terms serves to underscore the
intimacy of the relation between transcendence and immanence: the
fact that transcendent and immanent are prefigured, each in the other.
It is only by acknowledging the point at which we stand that the
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transcendent is ‘let be’ as such, as other to all that we presently are.
But equally, it is only by acknowledging what exceeds the here and
now that a faithful orientation to the present may be lived. The
situatedness of self is a precondition of experience, of knowledge and
of communication; the transcendence of the other is a function of this
situatedness, the fact that we are, as Heidegger claims, ‘thrown’ into a
world of the other. The possibility of perspective is a function of the
self’s ‘pre-reflexive being-in-the-world’; the situatedness of the self is
a transcendental condition of subjectivity and of intersubjectivity.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty has developed such a model of transcendence
in arguing that selfhood, situated in intercorporéité, is a condition of
both subject and object: ‘… the question is always how I can be open
to phenomena which transcend me … how the presence to myself
which establishes by own limits and conditions every alien presence
is at the same time de-presentation and throws me outside myself’.25
The identification of self as one is at the same time an openness to the
presence of the other; the givenness of one to other is in a certain
sense primordial. But importantly for Merleau-Ponty, this notion of
givenness is not a concept of transcendence in the traditional sense –
that is, an ideality divorced from the empirical world. Rather
transcendence is rooted in corporeality, in one’s spatio-temporal
presence in the world. The notion of transcendence can be used to
describe the way in which one’s corporeality is lived in relation to
that of others. Here Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy clearly influences
that of Irigaray, for whom the sensible transcendental ‘means ethical
fidelity to incarnation’.26
                                                           
25 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans Colin Smith
(London, 1962) 101. Merleau-Ponty refuses to consider this as a model of
transcendental consciousness; however, the concept of the transcendence he is
working with assumes its incorporeality by definition. For this reason, his model is
described by John H Smith, from whose analysis I borrow in this paragraph, as a
‘peculiar nontranscendent transcendental condition of subjectivity and
intersubjectivity’: John H Smith, ‘The Transcendence of the Individual’, Diacritics
19:2, 1989, 91. Smith employs Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intercorporeality in the
service of a model of the transcendence of the self; I follow Derrida and Levinas in
attributing transcendence to the other.
26 Irigaray, op cit, 217.
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Art as a Gift of Creation
With this concept of givenness – and of the ‘gift of the self’ – I return
to the question of art posed earlier, of the role of the transcendent in
the figuring of the aesthetic in modernity and postmodernity. If the
artistic is in some measure an expression of, and reflection upon, a
life lived in search of meaning and value, then it is as dependent as
any other aspect of our experience on an act of faith. Even conceived
most minimally, the artistic is an orientation towards the future,
towards the possibility of renewal – of oneself, of community –
through the medium of the visual. The artist, as I understand him or
her, works to build (or to challenge and so to rebuild) some
minimally shared framework of meaning, the foundations of an
edifice of common and communal significance. The assumption of
the possibility of shared meaning is itself the surest sign of a belief
that we must not give in to the violence of the present, to scepticism
and alienation. The artists’ despair, such as it is, can be recognised (as
that of an artist) only against the background of the faith in the
possibility of its expression, and so of its significance, both to the
artist and to the community. This faith of which I speak is an
expression of trust in the possibility of art as a medium directed
towards future, and higher, possibilities. It is thus also an expression
of trust in one’s neighbour. It bespeaks a trust that the other will take
what is given with the care and respect with which it is offered. This
trust, like the faith it reflects, is necessarily unfounded.
On the approach I am outlining here, contemporary art may be seen,
not merely as an excursion into immanence, but equally as an
expression of a faith in the transcendent. Far from a mere
simulacrum, it is something infinitely valuable: a gift that the artist
offers, a quintessentially human gift of creation. This is the reason
why art emerges only with the Fall (and it is worth pondering the
differences between the Greek and Christian mythic pasts on just this
count).27 There could be no art in Eden, where human creation is
                                                           
27 Nietzsche’s view in fact owes more to the Christian worldview than he admits: his
death of God philosophy follows Hegel in theorizing the implications of man’s
abandonment by God in the wake of Christ’s death. It is in this sense what Hegel
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largely redundant and faith, gratuitous. At the end of the century
which invented the postmodern condition and the beginning of this
new century, art is best conceived as an expression, not of God’s
boundless presence, but of God’s enduring absence. It is only where
the certainty of God’s loving presence is not available to us that faith
is needed. In truth, it is only there that faith is even possible, if by
faith one means a certain spirit or sensibility toward an uncertain
future, by contrast with a life lived in the abiding comfort of an
eternal present. Art arises where the discernible signs of God’s
presence in this world elude us (to say nothing of her goodness). Only
here can the visual field support the radical indeterminacy of the
artistic. It is in this abyssal space – in the place of the lost Eden, if
you like – that the gift of creation exists.
                                                                                                                             
described in the last paragraph of Faith and Knowledge as a ‘speculative Good
Friday’ philosophy. See W G F Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans Walter Cerf and
H S Harris (Albany, 1977).
